Freeport and the Suharto Regime, 1965-1998 by Leith, Denise
In functioning democratic economies a structural balance must be found
between state and capital. In Suharto’s autocratic state, however, a third
variable upset this equation: patronage. By using access to resources and
business as the major lubricant of his patronage style of leadership Suhart o
actively encouraged the involvement of all powerful groups within the
e c o n o m y. Eventually, the military, politicians, and the bureaucracy became
intimately involved in the most lucrative business ventures to the point
that to be successful in Indonesian business one required an influential
partner in at least one of these institutional groups, preferably with direct
access to Suharto.
When Freeport began negotiations with the new military regime in
Jakarta in 1967 to mine the copper in West Papua, the American transna-
tional with the valuable political connections was the more powerful of
the negotiating parties, enabling it to dictate the terms of its contract. As
Suharto’s political confidence grew and as the American company’s finan-
cial investment in the province increased—and by association its vulner-
ability—the balance of power shifted in Jakarta’s favor. Eventually Free-
port became another lucrative source of patronage for the president. 
E a r ly Histo ry of Fr e e p o rt in West Pa p ua
In 1936, while on an expedition to the center of the island of West New
Guinea, a Dutch geologist working for Shell Oil, Jean-Jacques Dozy, was
struck by the sheer magnificence of a 180-meter barren black rock wall
covered in green splotches standing above an alpine meadow.1 Realizing
he had discovered a huge copper outcrop Dozy knew that its inaccessibil-
ity meant “It was just like a mountain of gold on the moon” (Mealey
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1996, 71). The advent of the Second World War and the physical impos-
sibility of accessing the site in the rugged and inhospitable Carstensz
Range meant that Dozy’s re p o rt of the discovery of Ert s b e rg, or ore moun-
tain, lay forgotten for years.2
Freeport Sulphur Company (now Freeport-McMoRan Copper and
Gold Incorporated of the United States), became interested in Ertsberg in
1959 when a company geologist, Forbes Wilson, first heard of Dozy’s
report from a friend who, through his company Oost Borneo Maatschap-
pij (o b m), had taken out a concession for the area from the Dutch gov-
ernment. Persuading the company to send him to West New Guinea in
1960, Wilson was so excited by what he saw and sampled that he pre-
dicted correctly that Ertsberg would prove to be the largest above-ground
copper deposit discovered at that time. Having recently had its nickel-
mining projects in Cuba expropriated by Castro, Freeport was nervous
about making a substantial investment in the unstable region. Moreover,
the only way for a mining concern to access the site was via helicopter, and
even with the most powerful helicopter available at the time it would take
months to move just one small drill rig and crew to the remote site. Thus,
technical problems and political concerns saw Freeport shelving the Erts-
berg project in the early sixties. 
Fr e e p o rt’s Entry into West Pa p ua
In the boom times of the sixties, mining was the magnet for speculative
international capital, and the company did not forget the possibilities it
glimpsed in West New Guinea. In early November 1965, just a couple of
weeks after a military coup sidelined Indonesian President Sukarno, two
Texaco executives from Indonesia with close associations to the new mil-
itary regime approached Freeport. They informed the company that the
time was right to open negotiations with the generals in Jakarta over Erts-
berg (Wilson 1981, 155). Freeport’s subsequent decision to commit well
over a hundred million dollars to the risky project seemed extraordinary
given the political instability in Indonesia at the time. Freeport’s confi-
dence, however, may be understood in the context of its connections to the
highest echelons of power in Washington, the United States’ expanding
military power in the region, and its interest and influence in the events
unfolding in Indonesia. 
The chairman of Freeport Sulphur was, for a time, powerful Republi-
can John Hay “Jock” Whitney. Jock had founded the New Republic,
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became editor-in-chief of the New York Herald Tribune, owned a com-
pany that had contracts with the Defense Department, and had financially
supported the Eisenhower presidential campaign. He is also reputed to
have maintained ties with the Central Intelligence Agency after having
worked alongside business partner Nelson Rockefeller for the Office of
Strategic Services (o s s) (Pease 1996; Colby 1995; Reich 1996, 216–217).
Another board member, Robert Lovett, was an influential cold war leader
of the Washington establishment, having served under four pre s i d e n ts—a s
assistant secretary of war for Roosevelt, undersecretary of state for Tru-
man, deputy secretary of defense under Eisenhower, and adviser to Pres-
ident Kennedy on appointments. He also served as a member of Kennedy’s
secret Executive Committee of the National Security Council during the
Cuban missile crisis (Isaacson 1992, 357; Pease 1996; Reeves 1991, 222;
Colby 1995, 221; Schlesinger 1965, 116, 128, 685). Another influential
board member was Admiral Arleigh Burke who was a fervent anticom-
munist and one of the architects of the Bay of Pigs invasion (Wilson 1981,
186–187; Schlesinger 1965, 181). 
Augustus (Gus) Long, one of the two persons who originally
a p p roached Fre e p o rt suggesting it open negotiations with Jakarta in 196 5,
held a position on President Johnson’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
and was involved in the planning of covert operations. The other, Julius
Tahija, was a Texaco-Caltex executive and former military man, whose
close links with Sukarno and the military had enabled him to keep Caltex
and Texaco pro p e rty safe during the fifties, when Sukarno was in the pro-
cess of expropriating foreign assets. At the time Caltex was jointly owned
b y Texaco and Rockefeller’s S t a n d a rd O i l of C a l i f o rn i a . Tahija, Long, Hay,
and Lovett all boasted close links to the Rockefellers, while two Rocke-
feller family members, Jean Mauze and Godfrey Rockefeller, held seats
on the Freeport board, as did Rockefeller associate Benno C Schmidt.
Given such connections, it is not implausible that the company was
privy to information which satisfied it that, with backing from Washing-
ton, the generals in Indonesia, who were at the time overseeing the slaugh-
ter of Indonesian communists, would be able to ensure political stability.
As well, advancements in helicopter technology stimulated by the Vi e t n a m
War now made the operation technically feasible.
While Fre e p o rt ’s connections must have given it a measure of assurance,
the messages coming out of Jakarta were also viewed as positive. In 1966,
with the country facing bankruptcy, one of the main priorities of the mil-
itary regime was to gain international recognition and political support
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while attracting foreign aid and investment to foster stability, legitimacy,
and development. To entice western capital the regime promoted a decid-
edly pro-w e s t e rn, pro-f o reign investment alignment, which included purg-
ing the communists from within its ranks and the nation at large, and
employing a group of Indonesian economists trained in America who,
together with International Monetary Fund and World Bank experts, dre w
up a restructuring plan for the economy.
Although over time the balance of power would change between Free-
port and Jakarta, in 1967 the American mining company with the influen-
tial connections was the most powerful of the two, and there was little the
anxious generals in Jakarta would not do for Fre e p o rt. With new legisla-
tion yet to be passed to define foreign investment and the company re j e c t-
ing the old rules, Jakarta requested that F re e p o rt produce its own contract.
In April 1967, Freeport became the first foreign company to sign with the
new government and the only one to sign under such favorable condi-
t i o n s.3 As noted by a member of the Fre e p o rt negotiating team, given the
fact that Indonesia did not have sovereignty over the area at the time “the
legal basis for an agreement was vague” (Mealey 1996, 84). Moreover,
regulations at the time stipulated that Indonesia was not open for foreign
mining investment; the contract did not have the pre s i d e n t ’s signature, but
rather that of Lieutenant General Suharto as minister for defense and secu-
rity and head of the Presidium of the Ampera Cabinet (k e r e b o k 2000).
Forbes Wilson believed that Jakarta was probably under political pres-
sure from the United States to accept Freeport’s contract; however, an
Indonesian cabinet minister at the time, Professor Dr Mohammad Sadli,
claimed in 1998 that the acceptance of the contract was a political deci-
sion by Jakarta to exploit the “unsubtle connection” between letting for-
eign companies in and securing international support (Sadli 1998). That is,
by signing with Freeport the generals believed they were cementing ties
with the largest economy and most powerful state in the world. Given the
level of Freeport influence in Washington, the connection Jakarta made
through Freeport was impressive and its objectives feasible. Moreover, as
noted by retired Minister of Mines Soetaryo Sigit, the importance of the
Freeport contract was also that it indicated “to the world that Indonesia
[was] serious about trying to accommodate foreign investment” (Soe-
taryo 1998). 
The mutually supportive relationship that Jakarta hoped to nurt u re was
evident from the beginning. At an international conference convened in
Geneva in November 1967 to sell the new government’s business creden-
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tials, Freeport actively lobbied on its new partner’s behalf. With Freeport
symbolizing the new-frontier image Indonesia wished to promote inter-
nationally, and with pressure fromWashington, there followed a flood of
technical expertise and foreign capital—$1,226 million by 1969. This
inflow was not only crucial in keeping the regime afloat in the early years,
but its continuation assisted Suharto in maintaining power for another
three decades. 
In re t u rn for its services at such a critical time, Fre e p o rt ’s needs were ful-
filled by Jakarta: it got a highly favorable contract, the riches of Ertsberg,
and the Indonesian military to protect it. Under the contract, Freeport
was given mining rights for thirty years within a 250,000 acre concession
with a three-year corporate tax holiday. There were no Indonesian equity
re q u i rements, and Fre e p o rt was not under any obligation to the tradi-
tional Papuan owners of the land, the Amungme and Kamoro peoples.
The company was not required to pay compensation to the traditional
landowners, nor was it obliged to participate in local or provincial devel-
opment. Finally, there were no environmental restrictions. 
Because only small towns and oil exploration sites on the coast existed
in West Papua in the late sixties the project took five years to complete.
The first task was to cut an access road through the inhospitable terrain;
the road accounted for almost one-third of total mine expenditure and
took twice as long to build as all the other infrastructure combined. Bech-
tel, the American engineering company contracted to build the project for
Freeport, claimed that the access road was the most difficult project it had
ever undertaken (Wilson 1981, 192). Most bizarre of all, given the sur-
roundings, was the company town of Tembagapura (Copper Town). Built
ten kilometers below the mine complex in a highland valley surrounded
by jungle, it is a completely self-contained western dormitory-style town.
While the construction of the mine itself in the central mountains of West
Papua was an extraordinary engineering accomplishment, the company
also built a port and an airstrip in the lowlands. The company provided
all goods, services, infrastructure, and utilities for Tembagapura and the
mine, including such basic necessities as water, power, roads, medical sup-
p o rt , t r a n s p o rtation (air, road, and sea), accommodation, schooling, recre-
ation, food, and waste disposal. 
The building task was so daunting that in 1970 the problems Bechtel
was experiencing and the extent to which the budget had been exceeded
(expectations of around $120 million were exceeded by approximately
$80 million) saw Freeport’s funding at risk, forcing the company to
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threaten to cancel Bechtel’s contract (McCartney 1989, 157). In response
Bechtel offered to guarantee financing and called on the services of its
friend Henry Kearns who, as a close friend of Richard Nixon and head
of the Export-Import Bank, ignored the bank’s objections and had the
Freeport loan approved. Despite the financially advantageous contract,
the enormous construction costs and falling copper prices meant that a
profit was not realized until 1974.
The Beginnings of the Relationship with 
the Indonesian Elite.
Initially both Tahija and Texaco had been given a small interest in the
company (Sadli 1998; Tahija 1995, 161), and on Tahija’s advice Freeport
had engaged the legal services of former senior bureaucrat Ali Budiardjo
to assist with contract negotiations. Budiardjo was also given a financial
interest in the operation. 
By the mid-seventies, having invested around $300 million in the pro-
ject, the company was losing its previous advantage of capital mobility,
and by association its power was waning. At the same time Suharto had
become politically more secure on both the domestic and international
stages. Needing to service the rising debt of the oil company Pertamina4
and bolstered by nationalist sentiment at home, Suharto requested that
Freeport, which had just begun to realize a profit, forego the last eighteen
months of an agreed tax holiday. The president also requested that the
company give the government an 8.9 percent equity in the operation.
Given that Freeport Indonesia was an unlisted company and had, at that
stage, invested approximately $300 million in the project, an 8.9 percent
i n t e rest should have been valued at approximately $2 9 million. Instead the
government’s share was valued at $9 million. At the same time Budiardjo
was given the presidency of Freeport Indonesia. 
A few years later Jakarta came to its new partner’s aid. With copper
prices plummeting and Japanese buyers pressuring the company to cut
prices or close down the operation, Freeport was faced with serious prob-
lems. Jakarta responded by protecting the Freeport operation and, by
association, its own investment, by threatening the supply of Indonesian
oil to Japan (Tahija 1995, 164). At this stage, as noted by Ron Grossman
from Freeport’s financial department, “nothing was accomplished unilat-
erally, it was give and take. It was a very, very good relationship” (Mealey
1996, 85). 
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D i s c ov e ry of Grasberg and the New Contrac t s
For nearly twenty years Freeport operated quietly in West Papua, until by
the late eighties Ertsberg had all but died, leaving behind an open pit over
360 meters deep and 2 kilometers wide, filled with green, copper-impreg-
nated water. During its life Ertsberg had produced approximately 32 mil-
lion tonnes of copper, gold, and silver and had succeeded in generating an
average annual revenue of $30 0 million for the company. In 198 8 F re e p o rt
announced that about 2.2 kilometers away from Ertsberg it had discov-
ered its El Dorado, Grasberg. However, there had been rumors of the dis-
covery more than a decade before. Why the company decided to withhold
the announcement until 1988 is open to conjecture. Because o b m, the
original leaseholders, still retained a 5 p e rcent interest in Fre e p o rt Indone-
sia, the company may have waited until Ertsberg was exhausted to buy
out its partner cheaply. More o v e r, during the late seventies to mid-eighties
the decidedly unattractive Indonesian third-generation mining contracts,
which restricted foreign ownership of companies to an eventual 4 9 p e r-
cent, were in force. It would appear that it was in Freeport’s interest to
delay the announcement. 
After Freeport bought out its partner and the law was changed, Free-
port signed two new contracts for Grasberg in 1991 and 1994. Julius
Tahija described how, at the time, the company presented a proposition
to the government that he believed it could hardly refuse. While a num-
ber of companies had been given exploration permits around the original
Freeport concession, none had the capital to proceed with the costly oper-
ations. Freeport proposed that Jakarta give it permission to explore these
a reas, and in re t u rn it would spend $2 0 million on exploration while mak-
ing the results available to the government. Jakarta was then free to give
the concessions to whomever it wished. The government agreed, cancel-
ing the exploration permits it had given to other companies (Tahija 1995,
178). Not surprisingly, Freeport was eventually given the mining rights to
this land. In total the two contracts gave Freeport exploration rights for
approximately nine million acres across the spine of West Papua and the
right to mine any discoveries for a further fifty-year period. Once again,
F re e p o rt was not forced to operate under restrictive environmental laws or
to compensate the traditional landowners for loss of land.5
Positioned along the “ring of fire” (the geological zone where the Indo-
Australian and Pacific plates collide), the Freeport mining concessions are
in potentially one of the highest mineralized zones in the world. Referred
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to in the industry as “an elephant”—a geological term for an extremely
rich mineral deposit—Grasberg dwarfed Ertsberg in every respect. Not
only was it physically more imposing, but Ertsberg’s productivity pales
into insignificance compared with the riches unearthed at Grasberg. In
1999 alone Grasberg produced more than double the ore recovered from
E rt s b e rg during its life. What can be considered the Grasberg complex (the
G r a s b e rg mine and the surrounding above- and below-ground mines) con-
stitutes the world’s largest known deposit of gold (91.4 tonnes of gold
compared to its nearest rival, Freegold in South Africa at 60.44 tonnes6),
currently holds the world’s third-largest open-pit copper reserves (32 mil-
lion tonnes), and at extraction rates of less than 10 cents per pound has
the lowest extraction rates for copper in the world. Estimates of Gras-
berg’s worth continue to increase; despite all predictions, the final worth
of the mine is impossible to establish for it is classified as “open at depth,”
a euphemism for a bottomless pit, and yields a greater percentage of gold
per tonne the deeper the mine goes. Estimates of Grasberg’s eventual
worth have ranged from $54 billion to $80 billion. 
Similarly impossible to establish is the potential of the Freeport conces-
sion. Exploration on over 6,0 0 0 sites has identified about seventy poten-
tial mining sites, and drilling has commenced on a number of them.7 At its
peak, Ert s b e rg processed 2 5,0 0 0 tonnes of ore per day; currently Grasberg
is daily moving approximately 700,000 tonnes of earth and discarding
over 230,000 tonnes of it into the local river system as tailings. Grasberg
moves more tonnes of earth per day than any other mine. For comparison,
at its height Bougainville discharged around 1 4 0,0 0 0 tonnes per day and
Ok Tedi less than 1 0 0,0 0 0 ( E a rthbeat 1996). The open-pit Grasberg mine
is so large and located at such a high altitude that, except for early morn-
ing, the site is continually shrouded in cloud, necessitating satellite track-
ing of the huge mining trucks that operate 2 4 hours a day, 3 6 5 days a year. 
Once a company has committed large amounts of capital to a project,
the host nation is in a much stronger bargaining position. Between 1967
and 1991 the power relationship between the Indonesian state and fore i g n
capital shifted a number of times, whereas between the regime and the
company it had shifted significantly in the state’s favor. No longer was
Suharto plagued by political insecurities or desperate to please as he had
been in 1967. Instead twenty-four years of authoritarian rule allowed him
to exploit incoming foreign capital to support the patron–client relation-
ship that characterized the state. Conversely, once it had invested heavily
in the province, Freeport’s lack of mobility tended to undermine its bar-
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gaining position and it was willing to concede much to the state to secure
the mining rights to Grasberg as well as further exploration rights. Not-
withstanding the parading of Freeport “heavies,” Suharto drove a hard
bargain.
In January 1991, a year before the signing of the new contract, the gov-
ernment had increased its own holding in PT Freeport Indonesia from 8.9
percent to 10 percent for $18.1 million. As was standard procedure with
the Suharto govern m e nt, Jakarta was not re q u i red to outlay capital.
Instead, the transnational skirted the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
while managing to finance a foreign government into the company by
negotiating “carried interest.” That is, Freeport-McMoRan agreed to
withhold 40 percent of the dividends owed to Jakarta for its shares in
Freeport Indonesia until the purchase was paid for. Higher payments to
the government, restrictive exploration conditions, incorporation in Indo-
nesia, further Indonesian equity in the company, and an unwelcome com-
mitment to build a smelter on Java, were just some of the contract condi-
tions demanded by Jakarta.
The smelter in Gresik, east Java, represented a significant financial bur-
den for Freeport, which, with partners Mitsubishi Materials Corporation
(60.5 percent), Mitsubishi Corporation (9.5 percent), and Nippon Min-
ing (5 percent), completed the project in 1999. During construction, costs
skyrocketed from an estimated $300 million to $700 million. To ensure
the completion of the project Freeport agreed to “support an after-tax
return of 13 percent to the larger partner, if necessary, for the first twenty
years of commercial operations, [while] the 10 percent partner was given
an option . . . to require the parent company, Freeport-McMoRan Cop-
per and Gold Inc, to purchase the 10 percent interest at a 10 percent
annual return” (Freeport 1994, 33). Apparently Suharto’s notorious char-
ity, Nusamba,8 partnered Mitsubishi Materials in this lucrative venture
(Shari 1998). 
In accordance with the terms of the contract, the operating subsidiary,
Freeport Indonesia, was incorporated in Indonesia and changed its name
to PT Freeport Indonesia. As in 1967, this second contract saw Freeport
as the first company to sign under a new Foreign Investment Law that gave
p re f e rence to foreign mining companies like Fre e p o rt investing in the
n a t i o n ’s underdeveloped eastern provinces. These companies were allowed
to retain 100 percent ownership of their operation while foreign compa-
nies investing in the other provinces were required to gradually divest up
to 51 percent of their shares to Indonesian nationals. Despite this law,
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Suharto took the opportunity to extend his patronage by demanding fur-
ther Indonesian equity in the Freeport operation. 
Ginandjar Kartasasmita, the minister of mines and energy and a patron
of the indigenous business community, informed Freeport-McMoRan
that it was required to divest 20 percent of its Freeport Indonesia equity
within ten years to Indonesian nationals and thereafter another 25 per-
cent in 2.5 percent lots. Moreover, should it fail to sell at least another 20
percent of this second allotment of shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange,
it would be required to divest 51 percent of Freeport Indonesia shares to
Indonesian nationals (c ow 1991). There seems to be no record of this
second, unpalatable clause being made public at the time. 
With 90 percent of PT Freeport Indonesia held by Freeport-McMoRan
and approximately 10 percent held by the government, an Indonesian
buyer had to be found for another 10 percent within the next nine years.
The group that Freeport-McMoRan sold this 10 percent to was the Indo-
nesian conglomerate Bakrie Brothers headed by the minister’s friend, Abu-
r i z a l Bakrie. At the time Bakrie was I n d o n e s i a ’s m o st p ro m i n e n t i n d i g e n o u s
businessman and, along with Ginandjar, had been a member of Suharto’s
notorious Team 10.9 At the time he was also close enough to Suharto to
be considered a family member (Aditjondro 1998). All parties involved in
the negotiations have publicly stated that Freeport’s decision to sell to
Bakrie was purely a business decision, with no pressure from the govern-
ment. In 1996 Paul Murphy, the executive vice president of PT Freeport
Indonesia, related an entirely different version of events. 
Murphy claimed that when the company was informed of the contrac-
tual obligations, Freeport-McMoRan was thinking of listing the Freeport
Indonesia shares on the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Given that at the time
the total value of the Jakarta Stock Exchange was reported to be only $60
million, the suggestion that Freeport-McMoRan was considering listing
over $200 million of PT Freeport Indonesia shares is questionable.
According to Murphy, however, this option was thwarted by Ginandjar,
who told the company that the government would send three potential
partners from which the company could make a choice. In late 1990
Aburizal Bakrie paid a private visit to Freeport’s Chief Executive Officer
Jim Bob Moffett, in Louisiana, informing him that he was the partner
Freeport required (Borsuk 1994, 1). To Murphy’s knowledge Freeport-
McMoRan had no choice, with Bakrie the only potential partner ever sent
by Jakarta. He described the decision to sell to Bakrie years before it was
contractually required as a “sign of good faith” between the company
and the Suharto government, although director general of mines at the
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time, Kosim Gandataruna, is reported to have claimed that Ginandjar
recommended to Freeport to sell immediately (Murphy 1996; Waldman
1998). 
According to Freeport-McMoRan’s 1991 annual report, on 31 Decem-
ber 1991, just one day after signing the contract with Jakarta, Freeport-
McMoRan issued 10 percent of PT Freeport Indonesia to Bakrie Broth-
ers. Freeport-McMoRan was then paid $212.5 million on 6 January 1992
for the stock, but Bakrie only ever supplied $40 million of this. Freeport-
McMoRan and Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold jointly guaranteed
the remaining $173 million of the payment to itself on behalf of the Indo-
nesian businessman with important connections (Freeport 1991, 30–31).
The first loan repayment by Bakrie Brothers was due exactly one year
later, in December 1992. Bakrie never made this repayment because just
one week before this date it sold 49 percent of its PT Freeport Indonesia
shares back to Freeport-McMoRan for approximately $211.9 million
(Borsuk 1994). There appear to be problems with this deal. 
Freeport’s 1991 contract stipulated that it must have a 20 percent Indo-
nesian share holding; there f o re Fre e p o rt-McMoRan could not directly buy
back 4.5 percent of its own shares from Bakrie Brothers as this would
increase its direct holding in PT Freeport Indonesia to approximately 85
percent. In an attempt to overcome this legal impediment Bakrie Broth-
ers listed its holding of Freeport shares on the Jakarta Exchange through
a company it created expressly for this purpose, PT Indocopper Inves-
tama. Indocopper’s only asset at the time was the Freeport shares. Free-
port-McMoRan then purchased 49 percent of this Indonesian company
on 23 December 1992 for just short of $211.9 million. Given the terms
of the new contract (2 0 p e rcent Indonesian equity), Fre e p o rt-M c M o R a n ’s
i n d i rect purchase of shares through PT Indocopper Investama violated the
t e rms of the 1991 contract. Thus, exactly one year after purchasing the 1 0
p e rcent interest in Fre e p o rt, for $2 1 2.5 million, and precisely when Bakrie
B rothers was due to make its first installment on the Fre e p o rt shares, Fre e-
port-McMoRan paid Bakrie close to the original purchase price for half
the number of shares.10 Not only was Bakrie saved from making its first
payment, but the twelve-month deal gave Bakrie 5.5 percent of Freeport
for virtually nothing, with Bakrie making over $200 million on an outlay
of $40 million. 
Even though the original p u rc h a s e by B a k r ie B rothers officially occurre d
on 31 December 1991, when the market price of Freeport-McMoRan
Copper and Gold shares was approximately $32.88, the company has
claimed that the purchase price for the deal had been negotiated twelve
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months earlier, in January 1991. At that time Freeport-McMoRan Cop-
per and Gold’s Class A common stock—the shares on which the deal was
calculated—were trading at approximately $19.50. Thus, with the stock
rising to $43.76 (adjusted for share splits) by December 1992—when
Freeport-McMoRan bought back the Freeport stock from Bakrie—the
company could justify paying Bakrie double the purchase price. However,
if the purchase price had been calculated on the official date of the trans-
action, that is 31 December 1999, Bakrie would have needed to pay $73
million more for the share holding. Not only are the financial calculations
questionable, but if Freeport-McMoRan had agreed in January 1991 to
sell 10 percent of PT Freeport Indonesia, the shareholders of Freeport-
McMoRan and the market were legally entitled to be informed. 
In March 1997 it would appear that Bakrie, no longer in Suharto’s
favor, was forced by the president to sell his remaining Freeport shares,
held by PT Indocopper Investama, to Suharto’s yayasan, Nusamba, for
$315 million. Nusamba supplied $61 million of the purchase price, while
Freeport underwrote the balance of $254 million. Just one month before
this deal was finalized Freeport had been offered a 15 percent interest by
the president in what appeared at the time to be the biggest gold find in
history, Busang.11 With Freeport agreeing to subsidize interest payments
on the Nusamba loan, by 2000 the company had apparently lent the
Suharto yayasan $43.7 million (Bryce 2000). At the end of July 2001,
Freeport announced a $525 million offering of convertible senior notes
that, in part, may be used to pay the balance of the $254 million loan
taken out on behalf of Nusamba should Nusamba default. The loan is
guaranteed by Freeport-McMoRan and due to mature in March 2002.12
B e f o re Suharto was forced from office, the original deal bro k e re d
between Bakrie, Freeport-McMoRan, and the Suharto minister would
never have been allowed to make front-page news, but in late 1998, with
the issues of corruption, collusion, and nepotism dominating the political
agenda, the ethics of this deal were questioned by American academic Jef-
frey Winters when he suggested that Ginandjar’s involvement in the deal
was worthy of investigation (Catan 1998). It was also claimed at the time
that Ginandjar’s son, Agus Gumiwang Kartasasmita was given a waste
disposal contract with Fre e p o rt. Ginandjar, Bakrie, and Fre e p o rt
responded by denying Ginandjar had any involvement in the deal. The
minister also claimed that none of his children had a contract with Free-
port. As noted previously, Murphy stated in 1996 that Ginandjar sent
Bakrie to partner Freeport-McMoRan, while in the same year a company
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publication noted that its sewerage treatment systems would be priva-
tized and run by PT Agumar Rust Indonesia, of which the minister’s son
Agus is a 30 percent shareholder (p t f i 1996, 23:16). Members of Ginan-
djar’s immediate family have also been employed by the company.
O u t s o u rcing and Purc h asing an Insurance Policy
After the signing of the contract, Freeport’s actions were dictated by the
time constraints built into the contract, which in turn exacerbated existing
financial problems. Freeport needed to acquire as much capital as quickly
as possible to expeditiously complete an extensive exploration and expan-
sion program. Eventually Freeport was forced to outsource or privatize
most of its nonmining activities. 
Freeport’s restructuring program saw it subcontracting the building of
new, nonmining infrastructure to outside companies and selling off non-
mining or nonoperating assets such as service industries (eg, electricity,
shipping, residential, and so on). In all instances, it would appear that the
assets were sold to Indonesians with close associations with the Suharto
f a m i l y, and Fre e p o rt maintained a minor partnership. The purchaser guar-
anteed that it would operate these assets and provide the goods and ser-
vices back to Freeport and in return Freeport would provide a fee and a
g u a r a n t e e d i n c o m e . By giving individuals with p o w e r, wealth, a nd p o l i t i c a l
influence a risk-free interest in the continued operation and profitabili t y
of Freeport, the outsourcing program effectively strengthened the com-
pany’s political insurance policy with the Suharto regime. Although Free-
port liked to argue that its outsourcing program was devised to redefine
its role in the community and accumulate wealth by selling off assets, the
arrangements made were economically lucrative for the Indonesians and
of dubious economic value to the company. Nevertheless, at the time such
deals appeared to be politically astute moves.
The biggest winner in the outsourcing program was Dr Abdul Latief
who became Suhart o ’s minister for manpower and, like Bakrie and Ginan-
d j a r, was one of the favored members of Suhart o ’s Team 1 0. According to
Peter Waldman, Latief was also introduced to Freeport by Ginandjar,
although Ginandjar has denied this (Waldman 1998; Robinette 1998).
Freeport and Latief became joint partners in an operating principal called
PT ALatieF Nusakarya Corporation (ALatieF), which bought housing a n d
shopping complexes in Tembagapura and the Sheraton Inn in Timika fro m
F re e p o rt. As was usual business practice, the Suharto favorite was well
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looked after by the company, for not only did Freeport-McMoRan guar-
antee a minimum rate of return on Latief’s investment (15 percent after
tax), but Freeport-McMoRan raised and guaranteed most of the finance
for the purchase. 
By 1993 ALatieF had purchased from Freeport nonmining assets worth
approximately $270 million, with Freeport—the 33 percent partner—
guaranteeing 66 percent of the purchase price totaling $180 million
through the parent company, Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold.
Abdul Latief, with a 66 percent share of ALatieF, was required to provide
only $90 million. By 1998 ALatieF purchases from Freeport had risen to
$370 million, with Freeport carrying $255 million or 66 percent of the
debt and Abdul Latief assured of 66 percent of the profits. 
In 1994, when Freeport wanted to extend its exploration area, another
new contract saw it taking another influential Indonesian partner. PT
Setdco Ganesha (Setdco) and PT Indocopper Investama were each given
a 10 percent interest in the new area. While Bakrie shared ownership of
Indocopper with Freeport-McMoRan, the Setdco Group was owned by
Setiawan Djody who was also introduced to Freeport by “someone in the
Ministry” (Waldman 1998). Djody was not only friends with two of
Suharto’s sons, Sigit and Tommy, but was a partner in a number of
Suharto family ventures. By his own admission Djody’s success rested on
his association with the Suhartos, especially Tommy.13
Julius Tahija, through a subsidiary called Austindo Nusantara Jaya, was
also given a 10 percent interest in a joint venture between Duke Energy
Corporation (30 p e rcent), PowerLink Corporation (30 p e rcent) and Fre e-
p o rt (30 p e rcent). This joint venture called Puncak Jaya Power entered into
an agreement with Freeport where for approximately $215 million it
would purchase and expand Freeport’s existing power-generating project
and sell the electrical power service back to the company. As usual, in
return Freeport was required to guarantee Puncak Jaya Power “a mini-
mum rate of re t u rn and [was] obligated to make minimum payments suffi-
cient to allow the joint venture to meet its debt service” (Freeport 199 4,
3 2). Ginandjar’s bro t h e r, also Agus Kartasasmita, sought a partnership in
the joint venture running Fre e p o rt ’s power system but was rejected, appar-
ently because his company refused to provide any capital.14 He was, how-
ever, afforded a share in the company’s airline through his small con-
glomerate PT Catur Yasa. Moreover, it has been claimed that two of the
S u h a rto children, Bambang Triatmodjo (Fre e p o rt cargo ships) and To m m y
(power) also held, or continue to hold, contracts with Fre e p o rt. Finally, on
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the recommendation of Ginandjar, a Golkar party15 faithful, Prihadi San-
toso, was employed by Freeport and currently holds the powerful posi-
tion of executive vice-president responsible for government relations. 
By 1997 it was rumored that Suharto was upset by the extent of Gin-
andjar’s friends’ lucrative contracts with Freeport and a number of these
were retracted and given to Suharto’s closest friend and business partner,
Bob Hasan, through his company PT Pangansari Utama. Pangansari
remains a major catering contractor to Freeport in West Papua.
What was reported by Freeport as an asset-raising exercise simply
resulted in further debt for the cash-strapped company, with journalist
Peter Waldman calculating that between “1991 and 1997 Freeport made
at least $673 million of loan guarantees to finance three Indonesians with
close ties to Mr Suharto or his ministers” into the company (Waldman
1998). By selling its nonmining assets to influential Indonesians, Freeport
was making expensive payments on an insurance policy and doing busi-
ness the Suharto way.
The Importance of Fr e e p o rt to Ja k a rta
F rom the very beginning Fre e p o rt had been considered by the govern m e n t
to be one of the nation’s most valued assets and, according to Suharto,
essential to the economy. Initially, Freeport’s importance arose from the
political ramifications of the 1967 contract. Throughout the seventies and
eighties, however, Freeport’s continued capital investment, its ability to
extract the precious metals, and its political importance to the regime
increased the company’s stature. Not only did the company become the
principal developer and de facto administrator of the area around its mine
in West Papua, but the company and its associates have the distinction of
being one of the most successful and outspoken Indonesian lobby groups
in the United States. With the discovery of Grasberg the potential political
and economic worth of the Freeport operation to the government became
incalculable. 
From 1975 to 1986 Freeport paid the government, on average, $28.2
million per year and in 1988–89 it became the nation’s largest taxpayer.
By 1995, with a rise in copper prices and increased extraction rates, Free-
port paid direct to the government $295 million in dividends, taxes, and
royalties out of gross revenues of $1.48 billion. In the same year the com-
pany claims that indirect benefits totalled another $997 million. However,
by 1999, with a fall in resource prices, direct payments to the government
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fell to $173 million in taxes and royalties and $29 million toward local
development. In total, between 1991 and 2000 Freeport paid direct ben-
efits to Jakarta of $1.6 billion. But direct benefits were always outstripped
by indirect benefits, which in the same period totalled approximately $7
billion, although this last figure is inflated by the inclusion of funds rein-
vested in company operations (p t f i 2000). In sum, since the company
began operating, it has calculated that by the end of 1999 it had paid
directly and indirectly a total of $10.2 billion to Indonesia, with 87 per-
cent of total revenues “remain[ing] in and benefit[ing] Indonesia” (p t f i
1999, 3). Given that the company claims it has invested $4 billion in the
mine and infrastructure, how much of the $10.2 billion has benefited
Indonesians or Papuans and how much has been reinvested in the com-
pany? Freeport also became one of the largest private employers in Indo-
nesia and, by its own account, runs one of the largest social-economic
development projects in that country. Paradoxically, with falling copper
prices at the end of the century resulting in a dramatic decline in Fre e p o rt ’s
contributions to the government, the company’s financial importance to
Jakarta only increased. The rupiah crash in 1997–98, which saw the
majority of Indonesian conglomerates insolvent or technically bankrupt,
meant that F re e p o rt ’s f o reign currency earnings increased its relative value.
F re e p o rt dominates the economy of West Papua, with its operations and
offshoots making it the largest purchaser and employer in the province
(l a bat-Anderson 1997, 1-1). In 1996, by its own account, it was respon-
sible for over 50 percent of gross national product, while the Jakarta Post
credits its royalties as accounting for 70 percent of gross national prod-
uct between 1985 and 1998 ( JP, 22 Feb 1999). Moreover, in 1995 Freeport
accounted for 86.52 percent of total imports to the province from outside
Indonesia (Elmslie 2000, 104). In the first half of 1997 alone, Freeport’s
increased copper-concentrate production was said to have accounted for
88.8 percent of a $56.6 million rise in West Papuan exports ( I T, 18 Sept
1997). Theoretically, Freeport’s exploitation of the copper and gold in
West Papua should have benefited the province greatly, for Indonesian
mining law stipulates that 80 percent of royalties and land rents are to be
channeled back to the province of origin (u n c ta d 1994, 12). In practice
the province benefited little from the taxes Fre e p o rt paid direct to Jakart a ,
and little was ever constructively returned. 
The Suharto regime focused development on the west of the country,
most specifically Java, and accumulated wealth at the center in order to
support the patron–client state. Rather than supporting social and eco-
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nomic programs in West Papua, Jakart a ’s focus was on the exploitation of
the pro v i n c e ’s natural re s o u rces and the control and dispossession of the
Melanesian population through the militarization and “Indonesianiza-
tion” of the area. Around the Fre e p o rt mine site, Jakarta delegated respon-
sibility for any social and economic development to the company, so that
Freeport assumed the inappropriate role of developer and administrator
of its project area. Until the mid-nineties Freeport assumed this role not
simply because the central government was not interested in accepting its
responsibilities, but because it suited the company to do so. In the absence
of any recognizable bureaucratic presence, what Freeport essentially cre-
ated in and around its project area was its own fiefdom, with Jakarta sup-
plying the military to protect it. 
When Freeport arrived in West Papua, it was a remote and isolated
backwater. By 2000 the company had invested approximately $4 billion
in the area and had become the largest single American investor in Indo-
nesia. Without any notable aid or assistance from the government, in
thirty years the company created an extensive road system around the
mine (to United States standards) and built an international airport, a
f o u r-star hotel, two hospitals, telephone systems, power stations, a deep
water port, and two American-style towns. After the company faced crit-
icism over its social and human rights policies, it committed large amounts
to social and c o m m u n i t y s e rvices, spending $153 million between 1992 a n d
1999 on schools, scholarships, health care, and housing. The company
also maintained its own water, electricity, sanitation, and garbage utilities
and, in the later years, assisted the local government with these services
for the people in the project area. 
The company’s purchasing power and its ability to employ large num-
bers of people made it a magnet for population transfer (approximately
3,000 residents in the sixties to over 100,000 by the end of the century).
It also made the area one of increasing economic activity, both legal and
illegal, and an obvious high-profile target for anti-Indonesian protest
from within the province. In response to these changes, together with the
increasing economic importance of the company to Jakarta, the military
p resence increased; in the same period the occasional foot patrol had been
extended so far that the Freeport contract area had become one of the
most militarized zones in the archipelago. Despite these enormous social
changes, the bureaucratic presence remained inadequate, with the area
traditionally being considered the lowest rung of the civil-service ladder.
Jakarta has always relied on the presence of the military to secure the
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interests of foreign capital by controlling unrest, yet because the center
was never able, or indeed willing, to adequately fund this institution, the
Indonesian Defense Force or tni (which until 1998 included the police),
was encouraged to rely on access to business—either through direct sup-
port or direct engagement—to perform its operations. This destructive
military-business alliance has thrived around the Freeport concession, for
not only does the military openly participate in most of the business in
Timika and the surrounding villages—much of which is illegal—but it is
logistically and financially reliant on Freeport support.
Until the mid-nineties Fre e p o rt appeared content to have the military to
protect it and virtually no bureaucracy to interfere in its activities. If the
local population proved difficult, the company could rely on the military
to maintain order. In 1995, however, two damaging human rights reports
were released, detailing the killing of the indigenous people in and around
the project are a (ac f oa 1995; Catholic Church 1995). These re p o rts were
closely followed by riots targeting company property, and international
attention was sharply focused for the first time on Freeport’s operations
and its relationship with the military. In response, the company claimed
that it was being unfairly held accountable for the violent actions of this
institution and the appalling conditions in which many of the traditional
landowners lived. The blame, it stated, lay firmly with the government.
S u p p o rted by the United States ambassador to Indonesia, Fre e p o rt claimed
that it was time Jakarta accepted its responsibilities, suggesting that the
bureaucratic presence be increased and more of its tax dollars be invested
in the development of the local area. Suharto responded by suggesting that
the company needed to build better relations with the people living in its
p roject area—e ffectively re t u rning the responsibility for any social pro b-
lems to the company. The ac f oa report also caused Freeport to attempt
to place some distance between itself and the military. But with Fre e p o rt
committing tens of millions of dollars to supply infrastru c t u re to the mil-
i t a ry in the hope it would refrain from using Fre e p o rt ’s facilities, the com-
pany simply succeeded in further strengthening ties between the two, espe-
cially in the eyes of the traditional landowners. 
Although in theory Indonesian law recognizes customary land rights
under adat or customary law, in practice traditional land rights carry no
legal weight, as the Indonesian legal system is based on cultural values not
sympathetic to the Papuans’ spiritual relationship with the land and their
hunter-gatherer existence (Ondawame 1997). What this means in practi-
cal terms is that should valuable resources be found on traditional lands,
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or should the state determine that it re q u i res such land, then it automati-
cally becomes tanah negara ( s t a te-owned land). The expeditious and wide-
spread use of this law was instrumental in building the wealth and sus-
taining the power of the Suharto regime for over thirty years. Accord i n g l y,
when Freeport discovered copper and gold in the Carstenz Range, the
indigenous people (who practiced stewardship, or a customary form of
land use and ownership which ensured that the land was passed down
t h rough the generations) lost all rights to their land and its wealth in favor
of what Jakarta defined as the greater good of the nation. Little compen-
sation was required, and what wealth was generated did not belong to the
customary owners but to the state. By providing the expertise and fund-
ing that Jakarta could not to exploit the resources found on traditional
lands, foreign companies such as Freeport became exceptionally wealthy
at the expense of Indonesia’s most disenfranchised peoples. 
However, the traditional landowners of the Freeport concession have
not accepted the company’s right to occupy their land, or the destruction
of their environment, and have continually challenged its presence. In the
early years Freeport cared little for these people’s concerns, but the dis-
c o v e ry of Grasberg and the understanding that the company might re m a i n
in the province for another fifty years saw it making a commitment to
address the traditional people’s development concerns. Moreover, Free-
port was sensitive to the fact that local resentment had closed down the
nearby copper mine on Bougainville, and that at the Ok Tedi mine the
local landowners had launched a highly publicized, damaging, and ulti-
mately successful lawsuit against Broken Hill Proprietary, the Australian
mine operator.16 Not until the release of the ac f oa report and its claims
of human rights violations involving the company did Freeport become
serious in its efforts and commit itself to spending at least 1 percent of its
annual gross revenue, or approximately $15 million over each of the next
ten years. 
At approximately the same time as Freeport announced this commit-
ment, Amungme leader Tom Beanal, with the assistance of Indonesian
and international nongovernment organizations, lodged a $6 billion class
action suit against Freeport in the United States courts, claiming that the
m i n e ’s operations had led to the violation of human rights, enviro n m e n t a l
destruction, and cultural genocide. Eventually the presiding judge ruled
against Beanal, and a second suit that followed two years later, stating
that both complainants had failed to prove their cases (Times-Picayune
1998).17
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With Freeport providing funds for housing, schools, medical facilities,
and job training schemes, there has been a marked improvement in health,
education, and employment opportunities in the area. However, while tra-
ditional tribal life was difficult and dangerous, before the company came
everybody had a job, a home, land, and most important, a strong, spiri-
tual culture as a point of re f e rence. Today the negative effects of develop-
ment are evident everywhere within the concession as the social fabric of
Papuan life disintegrates. Unemployment, lawlessness, a i d s, drug abuse,
and social, spiritual, and economic dislocation are evident. As the govern-
ment established twelve transmigration camps1 8 in and around the Fre e-
port concession and the area became a magnet for migrants, the tradi-
tional landowners were displaced and marginalized, becoming a minority
within a minority on their own land.19 Moreover, with the concession
now awash with Fre e p o rt development funding, disagreements within and
between once relatively harmonious indigenous tribes over the payment of
compensation and access to development funding have divided the com-
munity and marred development programs, threatening to create a wel-
fare-dependent society.
While Freeport has been critical of the government’s neglect and dis-
enchanted with the sociodevelopment role it has been forced to accept, it
is not surprising that the Suharto regime regarded the company highly:
The parent company in the United States acted as a high-profile public
relations agent for the Suharto regime and became part of one of Amer-
ica’s most outspoken and successful Indonesian lobby groups.
In the last decade the disintegration of the communist threat removed
part of the legitimizing rationale of western support for authoritarian
regimes such as Suharto’s. At the same time the increasing political
activism of nongovernment organizations has meant that these regimes
have been forced to adopt “informal diplomacy,” that is, the hiring of
high-profile public relations firms and the manipulation of lobby groups
to protect their interests. In this regard the Suharto regime was able to
rely on its powerful corporate and bureaucratic friends. 
Financial support of politicians in the United States usually compels
them to support the interests of their benefactors. Between 1991 and 1995
Freeport and its company affiliates officially gave $650,000 to politicians
(South and Haurwitz 1996, a1). One politician generously supported by
Freeport was home-town Senator Bennett Johnston, who was so success-
ful in promoting Indonesia that in late 1995 he was described as “the most
pro-Indonesian member of the US Congress” (Schwarz 1995) and had the
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dubious distinction of being Washington’s biggest supporter of American
arms sales to Indonesia. By 1998 Johnston was retired from politics and
on the board of Freeport-McMoRan. In the last twelve months the com-
pany has given $262,703 to politicians (e m c b c 2000) making it the sec-
ond largest contributor from the mining industry.
Freeport is also a member of the US–Indonesia Society—a group that
works actively to maintain the Jakarta–Washington relationship. Formed
in 1994 to counter threats posed to the Indonesian business community
due to the lobbying efforts in Washington of nongovernment organiza-
tions and trade unions, the society has today become an influential pro-
Indonesia group. Reflecting the level of American investment in Indonesia,
its membership has been impressive. Business community representatives
include Freeport-McMoRan, Texaco, General Electric, Mobil, Chevron,
American Express, Edison Mission Energy, Hughes Aircraft, and Merrill
Lynch, all of which have or had business associations with the Suharto
family or influential Indonesians under the Suharto regime.20 Former
ambassadors and senior bureaucrats in the society have included Paul
Wolfowitz, Edward Masters, George Benson, and George Schultz. Indo-
nesian elite under Suharto also took defining roles in the society, includ-
ing members of Suharto’s extended family.
The society claims it is not a lobby group and plays no advocacy role,
describing itself as a nonpartisan educational organization. This assertion
is worth questioning. With nongovernment organizations having sway in
Washington, the US–Indonesia Society’s job has been to counter their
influence by downplaying the issues of human and labor rights. During the
Suharto years the society promoted the concept that it was more produc-
tive to work with Jakarta than to confront it over these issues. In this way
it lobbied Washington to ensure that political and financial support to the
dictatorship and its military was maintained and, by association, its own
investments protected by the elite in Jakarta.
The most persuasive argument an American corporation can make in
Washington is not necessarily the overt promotion of a foreign govern-
ment’s interests per se but the assertion that the company’s interests, and
by association those of the host nation, are identical to the home govern-
ment’s national interest. In this way American companies promote their
own interests, and if those interests coincide with those of the host nation
—as Freeport’s did with Suharto’s—then they are effectively promoting
the interests of the host nation to their own government. However, the
adoption of this promotional role by Freeport and the society was never
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p u rely altruistic. By working for the Suharto government in Washington to
e n s u re that the state-to-state relationship remained stable, Fre e p o rt was
reaffirming its political worth to Jakarta and safeguarding its investment.
Given the public nature and depth of the Suharto–Freeport relationship,
it was essential to Freeport’s own welfare to keep its friend secure in the
M e rdeka Palace. However, for those within Fre e p o rt who apparently pos-
sessed greater foresight than the flamboyant Moffett, the closeness of the
relationship between the company and the Indonesian dictator foreshad-
owed uncomfortable complications. With the fall of Suharto, as predicted,
these complications manifested themselves.
Just two months after Suharto was forced to resign in May 1988 the
Indonesian publication P ro s p e k ran a story claiming that in 1996 a n d 1997
F re e p o rt paid $2 0.3 million directly to Suharto through one of his y a y a-
sans and that, in exchange for the 1991 contract and the president’s pro-
tection, the company paid “tribute” each year of approximately $5–$7
million to Suharto (Prospek 1998). In late 1998 Freeport again made
front-page headlines in Indonesia when it was suggested that those com-
mitted to fighting corruption should investigate the Bakrie-Freeport-Gin-
andjar relationship. Politicians flexing their muscle in the new democracy
took the opportunity to establish nationalist credentials by attacking the
high-profile company now devoid of its powerful protector. Demands
quickly escalated to the cancellation of the Freeport contract. Belatedly
realizing how damaging such a move would be to the Indonesian econ-
omy, the politicians settled for calls to renegotiate the contract with a
greater distribution to Indonesians. 
In response to threats in the Indonesian parliament, Moffett re s o rted to
what had always worked in the past and in January 1999 flew to Jakarta
to pay a private visit to President Habibie. Shortly afterward Henry Kis-
singer, who had been a member of the Freeport-McMoRan board and an
employee of the company through Kissinger Associates since the eighties,
paid a private visit to President Wahid. In response Wahid informed his
ministers by letter that they were to give the company every assistance. For
a short time it appeared that Freeport had been able to assert its influence
in the new Indonesian democracy.
C o n c l u s i o n
Although the relationship between the president and the company
remained amicable and mutually beneficial for thirty-two years, a shift in
the balance of power was reflected in the company’s contracts. In 1967
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F re e p o rt ’s contacts in the United States and the promises of riches the com-
p a n y offered the struggling new government meant that Freeport could
dictate the terms of its investment. In 1991, with a change in the balance
of the power within the relationship, Suharto was better able to define
terms and to demand a much higher price from the American mining
company for rights to the largest gold mine on earth, the lowest extrac-
tion-price copper mine, and exploration rights to nine million acres. With
Jakarta content to provide the political and physical security for the com-
pany, by the nineties Freeport had become part of the president’s patron-
age system. 
Given its vast wealth of natural resources, the western half of the
Papuan island is considered an economic treasure chest that Jakarta can
ill afford to lose. Moreover, unlike East Timor where Indonesia’s claim of
sovereignty had never been internationally sanctioned, West Papua, with
its active separatist movement, has always been re g a rded as a political test
case of Jakart a ’s ability to control ethnic tensions within the diverse repub-
lic. With the military reliant on the company to perform its operations
around the Freeport concession and the company’s presence helping to
justify the “Indonesianization” and control of the province, the mine has
become intimately linked to the military and its continued incorporation
of West Papua into the Indonesian archipelago. Freeport’s economic and
political importance to Jakarta only serves to reinforce the province’s
significance to the center, so that the company will continue to be central
to both Jakarta and Jayapura’s political aspirations. Today, because of its
past associations, Freeport is vulnerable. 
Until the fall of Suharto, Freeport had been able to operate in West
Papua with relative impunity because it had a close, multifaceted, and
mutually beneficial relationship with the government, the military, and, in
the later years, with the Suharto elite. But today it has become a potential
pawn in the volatile West Papuan political situation. 
The provincial government in West Papua wants a stake in the com-
pany, and in an attempt to appease the troublesome province the director
general of mining in Jakarta has supported this claim. The traditional
landowners also continue to blame Freeport for the human rights abuses
committed by the military and remain disillusioned by the disparities of
wealth that exist within the concession. Many of the Amungme and
K a m o ro view the imposition of what they consider questionable develop-
ment programs as consolation prizes and a pittance compared to the riches
Freeport continues to extract from their land. Should the province’s fight
for independence turn violent, the company would be an obvious political
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and economic target for the Organisasi Papua Merdeka (o p m), activists
who alternately want the company’s operation closed down or support
from Freeport for their claim of independence. At the same time, should
Jakarta appear to be losing its struggle in West Papua, the Indonesian mil-
i t a ry, which also expects the company’s continued support, would be loath
to leave such an asset in the hands of the West Papuans. Today Freeport
is attempting to court both sides. Not only does it continue to support the
military in its concession, but it is financially supporting the Papuan Con-
gress, whose goal is independence (Joku 2001). The future of Freeport is
inextricably linked to the future of West Papua and fraught with difficul-
ties.
Notes
1 Dozy (1993 , 1 2). By the turn of the century the Dutch and other major pow-
ers were aware of the probability of vast natural re s o u rces in West New Guinea.
As early as 19 0 7 a Dutch geological exploration had surveyed the nort h e rn re g i o n
of the island and discovered oil seepages, which led to the merging of Dutch and
British Petroleum interests into the Royal Dutch Shell Company. Moreover, just
prior to World War One, pressure from expanding United States interests in the
western Pacific had forced Holland to grant limited concessions in the border
regions of the island to the Americans and the Japanese. Although exploitation
of the rugged and untapped central region of the island was repeatedly refused
by the Dutch administration, it was later discovered that early agricultural con-
cessions granted to the Japanese had been used for oil exploration (Budiardjo
1988, 3).
2 This rock was part of the Carstensz Range, which runs through the spine of
West Papua and contains Carstensz Top or Mount Jaya, the highest peak between
the Himalayas and the Andes. The mountain range also holds two of the world’s
five remaining equatorial glaciers, Carstensz and Meren. The first re c o rding of the
siting of the glacial mountain was from the Arafura Sea in 1 6 2 3 by the Dutch nav-
i g a t o r, Jan Carstensz.
3 Seven months after signing with Freeport, Indonesia enacted the new For-
eign Investment Law (1967) and a new mining law, ushering in more restrictive
conditions for mining contracts. 
4 Pertamina was the state-run oil company used by Suharto as a rich source
of funding to secure the loyalty of the military. What should have been an
extremely lucrative business was eventually left holding debts of approximately
$10 billion when Suharto’s trusted friend General Ibnu Sutowo was forced to
leave in 1976. Sutowo was never called to account for outstanding mismanage-
ment of Pertamina or for overt corruption, as an investigation would have led
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d i rectly to the pre s i d e nt. For descriptions of the uses made of Pertamina by
Suharto see Winters (1996) and Backman (1999). 
5 As with the 1967 Foreign Investment Laws, Jakarta provided guarantees
that it would neither nationalize nor expropriate the company’s mining opera-
tions, and provision for international dispute arbitration was also included (Free-
port 1993, 22). Under the terms of the new contracts Freeport agreed to pro-
gressively relinquish up to 75 percent of this area over a set period, although it
is allowed to mine potential areas of mineralization (Freeport 1991; 1992). The
1991 contract superseded the original 1967 contract and covered not only the
existing 24,700 acres (Block A) of the original Ertsberg mine but another con-
tiguous area of approximately 6.5 million acres (Block B) encompassing the new
Grasberg mine site and other areas. In 1994 a contract was signed by a PT
Freeport Indonesia subsidiary, pt ir ja Eastern Minerals Corporation (pt ir ja),
for another 2.6 million acres. This new contract encompasses three separate are a s
of land which are referred to as the Eastern Mining Block and are next to Free-
port’s A and B Block operations. These three blocks (Block A, Block B, and the
Eastern Mining Block) gave Freeport a total of 9 million acres of exploration
leases with a guaranteed thirty years of operating and the option of two ten-year
extensions.
6 However, Freeport is not the largest gold-producing company in the world.
Anglo American in South Africa has mines producing a total of 294.83 tons of
gold. In 1999 it was reported that Freeport was the fourth largest, behind Anglo
American, Newmont (124.62 tons), Placer Dome (106 tons), and Barrick (99.91
tons) (Drillbits 1999).
7 In May 2001 Freeport announced its latest discovery, called the Ertsberg
East Surface, which promised up to 1.1 billion pounds of copper and 2.5 million
ounces of gold.
8 Suharto’s “charities” (yayasans) were created by the president and his wife,
Tien, to supposedly address the disparities of wealth within Indonesia. Com-
monly referred to as his “retirement funds,” about ninety-five yayasans were
directly linked to Suharto, his family, or cronies. With Indonesian individuals or
companies required to “donate” a percentage of their earnings to the yayasans,
the lack of accountability and transparency meant that these organizations
became just another vehicle for the accumulation of untraceable wealth. The high-
est profile of these yayasans was Nusantara Ampera Bakti or Nusamba, formed
in 1982.
9 As part of Suharto’s affirmative action on behalf of pribumi (indigenous
b u s i n e s s e s), in 198 0 he established a highly favored group called Team 1 0 “t o
oversee government purchases of goods and services” on behalf of ministries, gov-
e rn m e n t bodies, state-owned companies, and eventually, the military. After suc-
cessive presidential decrees, each affording it greater power, Team 10 was finally
disbanded in 198 8, but not before it made its ten indigenous members exceedingly
rich, gave the Suharto children a helping hand in business, and successfully dis-
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posed of $48 billion of government procurements. As confided to Adam Schwarz
by a Team 1 0 m e m b e r, “It was Team 1 0 under Sudharmono that made Bakrie big,
it made me big, it made a lot of us big” (Schwarz 1994, 118–119). While the eco-
nomic objectives of Team 10 were well stated, the formation of this group had
an underlying political agenda, as its membership and the political positions they
w e re to hold clearly demonstrated. The p r i b u m i businessman who for a long time
was closest to Suharto, became the unofficial leading member of Team 10, and
eventually became head of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(k a d i n) was Aburizal Bakrie. In effect Team 10 became just another vehicle for
Suharto’s patrimonial style and a loyal pool from which to choose senior bureau-
crats and cabinet members. For more information on Team 1 0 see Schwarz (199 4,
118–119) and Winters (1996, 125–141); for further information on Bakrie see
O’Kane (1993).
10 In its 1991 annual report Freeport-McMoRan did not record a profit on
the original sale because payment for the shares was made in January of the fol-
lowing year, the same year in which 50 percent of the shares were repurchased.
11 In 1996 what became known as the Busang, or Bre-X, fraud rocked the
foundations of the erstwhile stable Indonesian mining industry and sent shock
waves through the wider international mining community. A year earlier a small
Canadian mining company, Bre-X Minerals Limited, announced that it had found
economically viable gold deposits at its Busang site in East Kalimantan. Over a
period of eighteen months, Bre-X continually reevaluated the gold reserves at the
Busang site until it claimed it had proven reserves of 70 million ounces, valuing
the find at $30 billion. Eventually, Bre-X hinted at the unheard-of possibility of
2 0 0 million ounces, which would have made it one of the largest gold deposits in
the world. Before long, Suharto’s golfing partner, Bob Hasan, had realigned the
ownership of the Busang lease on behalf of the president. The original leasehold-
ers were given a 30 p e rcent intere st; however, through Nusamba, Suharto took 2 5
p e rcent of this 30 p e rcent share, the government was given 1 0 p e rcent, Bre-X was
left with only a 45 p e rcent intere st, and Fre e p o rt, which was to provide all the
financing for the exploration and be the sole operator, was aff o rded 15 percent.
The government and Nusamba paid nothing for their interest. Eventually, Busang
was discovered to be nothing but a very elaborate fraud.
12 Freeport-McMoRan “has agreed that if [Nusamba] defaults on the loan,
[Freeport-McMoRan] will purchase the [PT Indocopper Investama] stock or the
lenders’ interest in the commercial loan for the amount then due” (Freeport-
McMoRan 1997). 
13 “If I failed to arrange meetings with ministers, I had to ring up either Sigit
or Tommy. In running shipping companies, I have received help from Sigit, and
in the automotive business, Tommy has helped me much” (Schwarz 1994, 150).
When Djody failed to carry his share of exploration costs the company confis-
cated his interests.
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14 Agus Kart a s a s m i t a ’s company, PT C a t u r Ya sa, was then given a 2 0 p e rc e n t
interest in a Duke-Fluor Daniel venture. Although this joint venture has approx-
imately two hundred employees and Catur Yasa contributes only one employee,
Ginandjar’s brother claims his company was chosen because of its professional-
ism (Waldman 1998).
15 The Golkar Party was formed by the military during the Sukarno years. It
eventually came under the control of Suharto and by continually “winning” elec-
tions was used by the ex-president to validate his democratic credentials and
control parliament.
16 The Ok Teki landowners eventually settled out of court in 1996 for
approximately $500 million. 
17 What was most significant for the Amungme, and indeed for Freeport and
all other American transnationals, was that the judge supported previous rulings
that the United States court had jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit brought by a for-
eign person against an American company for alleged wrongful acts committed
outside the United States. Today Tom Beanal sits on Freeport’s Board of Com-
missioners, apparently on behalf of the Amungme.
18 Transmigration was first introduced by the Dutch in 1905 when they
moved impoverished Javanese peasants to the less-populated areas, supposedly to
allow them to start a new life. In reality Dutch transmigration served primarily to
supply cheap labor to foreign-owned plantations. The Suharto regime’s transmi-
gration policy, which systematically moved large numbers of migrants from the
m o re crowded islands such as Java and Sulawesi to the outer re s o u rce-rich pro v-
inces where they were given about two acres of traditional land and supplied with
grain, clean water, and a house, was not dissimilar to the Dutch experiment.
Until recent years transmigration was successfully promoted internationally as
a socioeconomic program aimed at relieving the population pressure on the
densely populated main islands and received extensive financial support from the
World Bank and multinational groups channeling aid into Indonesia. Yet Jakart a ’s
transmigration policy has always concealed hidden agendas. 
Under Suharto transmigration was an integral part of the central govern m e n t ’s
policy of “Indonesianization” and focused on incorporating areas resistant to
Jakarta’s rule, such as East Timor, Aceh, and West Papua. At the same time, as
with Dutch transmigration, Indonesian transmigration has focused on ensuring
a supply of cheap and readily accessible labor to foreign enterprises operating in
the most remote regions of the archipelago. Thus, transmigration had a political
purpose (the control of the indigenous minorities), a cultural purpose (the alien-
ation and destruction of traditional cultures), and an economic purpose (support
for direct foreign investment). 
19 The traditional landowners are a minority within a Papuan minority in the
concession area; Indonesians are by far the largest ethnic group there. 
20 A society member was so supportive of the regime that it was apparently
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willing to break United States law. According to the Progressive Magazine, soci-
ety trustee Roy Huffington—who heads the United States oil company Huffco
and has lucrative contracts with Pert a m i na—was caught illegally shipping tort u re
equipment to the regime; he was subsequently fined $250,000 by the Department
of Commerce (Press 1997; Shorrock 1996).
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Abstract
In 196 7 the transnational mining company Fre e p o rt was the first foreign company
to sign a contract after Sukarno was sidelined by Suharto. Eventually, Freeport-
McMoRan Copper and Gold, through its subsidiary PT Fre e p o rt Indonesia, came
to operate the biggest gold mine and lowest extraction-price copper mine in the
world in the isolated mountains of the Indonesian province of West Papua. It
also became politically and economically significant to the Suharto regime. In the
absence of the central government, the American mining company became the de
facto developer and administrator of its concession in West Papua while in the
United States it served as an important political lobby group for Jakarta. With
Freeport becoming the largest taxpayer in Indonesia, one of the largest employ-
ers, and eventually running one of the largest socioeconomic programs in the
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republic, it was described by Suharto as essential to the nation’s economy. Free-
port’s importance encouraged the development of mutually beneficial and sup-
p o rtive relationships between the company, the Indonesian president, his military,
and the nation’s political elite. In return, Freeport was politically and physically
protected by the regime. Eventually, Freeport’s financing of the president and his
cronies’ interests in the company threatened to see Freeport violating the United
States’ Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
Today Freeport’s past relationship with Suharto has made it a high-profile tar-
get for anticorruption reformers in Indonesia. Because of the pivotal economic
role the company continues to play in Jakarta and West Papua, any question of
future independence for the province will be inextricably linked to the company.
k e y wo r d s: corruption, Freeport, Indonesia, mining, Suharto, West Papua
